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Socially anxious individuals have been shown to exhibit altered processing of facial
affect, especially expressions signaling threat. Enhanced unaware processing has been
suggested an important mechanism which may give rise to anxious conscious cognition
and behavior. This study investigated whether individuals with social anxiety disorder
(SAD) are perceptually more vulnerable to the biasing effects of subliminal threat cues
compared to healthy controls. In a perceptual judgment task, 23 SAD and 23 matched
control participants were asked to rate the affective valence of parametrically manipulated
affective expressions ranging from neutral to angry. Each trial was preceded by subliminal
presentation of an angry/neutral cue. The SAD group tended to rate target faces as
“angry” when the preceding subliminal stimulus was angry vs. neutral, while healthy
participants were not biased by the subliminal stimulus presentation. The perceptual bias
in SAD was also associated with higher reaction time latencies in the subliminal angry cue
condition.The results provide further support for enhanced unconscious threat processing
in SAD individuals. The implications for etiology, maintenance, and treatment of SAD are
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
According to evolutionary accounts of threat processing, affec-
tive facial expressions, especially those depicting a source of
direct (anger) or indirect (fear, disgust) threat represent a class
of signals relevant for survival. A great amount of empirical evi-
dence suggests that very quick processing of threatening signals
is a part of an innate functional repertoire of a healthy human
brain (Williams et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2005; Bar-Haim et al.,
2007; Ohrmann et al., 2007; Bishop, 2008; Bannerman et al.,
2009; LoBue, 2009; Pichon et al., 2012). These results can be
interpreted in terms of the preparedness theory, according to
which the existence of these neuronal mechanisms are beneﬁcial
for the survival of the organism (LeDoux, 2000, 2003; Öhman
et al., 2000, 2007; Öhman and Mineka, 2001a). Quick informa-
tion processing may translate to a crucial temporal advantage of
milliseconds to prepare for and execute a behavioral response
when faced with sudden danger. Due to direct neural projec-
tions to the visual cortex, the amygdala is considered to be
the key structure modulating this early processing advantage for
threatening information (Morris et al., 1998, 2001; Anderson and
Phelps, 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2004). In accordance with these
neuroimaging ﬁndings, prior studies have provided behavioral
evidence by demonstrating that fearful cues actually enhance per-
ceptual sensitivity (Phelps et al., 2006; Stolarova et al., 2006; Lim
and Pessoa, 2008). However, the threatening character of cer-
tain stimuli does not necessarily have to be inherent, but may
also acquire their aversive quality through learning experiences
(Stolarova et al., 2006; Keil et al., 2007a,b). These different types
of threatening stimuli may reﬂect qualitatively different aspects
of a threat, e.g., inherent vs. acquired, which may have affect
processing in different ways. Prior investigations from our work
group showed that participants acquired a perceptual bias to sub-
liminal threat only when inherently aversive stimuli (angry faces)
were paired with aversive outcomes via a prior conditioning pro-
cedure (Jusyte and Schönenberg, 2013). While this initial evidence
suggests that learning experiences may have enhance unconscious
visual processing of threatening stimuli, it remains unclear how
durable these effects may be and whether similar mechanisms
can be assumed in relevant psychopathologies, such as anxiety
disorders.
Generalized social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a prevalent mor-
bidity with a typically early onset and chronic manifestation
(Bruce et al., 2005). Symptoms revolve around an intense, persis-
tent (anticipatory) fear of social and performance situations that is
usually accompanied by increased autonomic arousal (McTeague
et al., 2009) and results in subsequent avoidance behavior (Fehm
et al., 2008). While avoidance is an undisputed maintaining mech-
anism in all anxiety disorders, it cannot fully explain the persisting
nature of SAD (Hirsch and Clark, 2004). A large number of
studies have pointed out that hypervigilance toward threaten-
ing information may represent a key mechanism contributing to
the maintenance of this disorder (Staugaard, 2010). It has been
suggested that social stimuli, especially faces signaling threat or
disapproval, are particularly salient for individuals with social
anxiety (Rapee and Heimberg, 1997), possibly as a result of the
inherent biological preparedness (Öhman and Mineka, 2001b)
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and aversive learning experiences. Accordingly, socially anx-
ious individuals have been shown to exhibit an attentional bias
toward angry faces in visual attention paradigms (Horley et al.,
2004; Pineles and Mineka, 2005; Klumpp and Amir, 2009) as
well as enhanced neural reactivity toward angry expressions in
limbic and extrastriate visual areas compared to healthy con-
trols (Stein et al., 2002; Straube et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2006;
Klumpp et al., 2012).
Enhanced unconscious threat processing is a possible mecha-
nism underlying cognitive biases in anxiety disorders, as they may
impact later processing stages and engender affective, cognitive as
well as behavioral phenomenology, thus giving rise to the overgen-
eralization of fear (Dunsmoor et al., 2011). Although numerous
studies have examined subliminal threat processing in other anxi-
ety disorders (Brooks et al., 2012), only few studies have addressed
this issue in socially anxious populations using disorder-speciﬁc
stimuli, i.e., threatening faces. Empirical evidence, which mostly
stems from analogous group studies, supports the notion that
(social) anxiety is associated with altered early visual processing
(Li et al., 2008), engagement and guidance of attentional resources
(Mogg and Bradley, 2002; Holmes et al., 2009), enhanced subcor-
tical response (Bishop et al., 2004; Phan et al., 2006; Vizueta et al.,
2011) and may affect subsequent social judgments (Li et al., 2008)
when the threatening stimuli are presented under conditions of
restricted awareness.
Our research group has previously established a paradigmatic
approach to investigate how subliminal threat cues may affect
perceptual decisions (Jusyte and Schönenberg, 2013). In a series
of experiments, healthy volunteers made affective judgments of
morphed affective stimuli that were blends of neutral and angry
expressions. Subliminal cues resulted in biased affective judg-
ments of the morphed stimuli (i.e., more “angry” responses) only
when the subliminal stimulus was angry and had been previously
paired with an aversive experience. These results indicated that an
acquisition of a perceptual bias to subliminal threat occurs only
when the negative primes were paired with aversive outcomes
in a previous conditioning procedure, which may mirror fear
acquisition in real-world contexts. As highlighted earlier, patients
with SAD represent a group with an especially pronounced bias
to threatening facial expressions associated with alterations in
preattentive processing. In contrast to healthy individuals, social
anxiety may be associated with an increased salience of angry
faces to such an extent, that even an unconscious “hint” of hos-
tility may be enough to distort visual processing, resulting in a
perceptual bias for anger even without prior conditioning, pos-
sibly due to prior aversive conditioning in real-world contexts.
SAD patients may be perceptually more vulnerable to the bias-
ing effects of unconscious threat cues, which could form the
basis of affective, cognitive and behavioral symptoms in social
anxiety.
The present study aimed to investigate this issue in individu-
als with SAD. Speciﬁcally, we were interested in whether subtle
signals of threat that are presented under conditions of restricted
awareness would result in biased performance on a subsequent
affective judgment task. We expected SAD patients to make more
“angry” responses if the preceding subliminal stimulus was angry
as opposed to neutral, but healthy control participants were not
expected to show this effect. The perceptual bias in the SAD group
was expected to be larger for ambiguous mask stimuli (morphed
facial expressions ranging between angry and neutral) due a larger
susceptibility to biasing effects of the subliminal cues. In accor-
dance with the affective judgment, we expected faster reaction
times (RTs) for unambiguous as opposed to ambiguousmask stim-
uli for both groups and a facilitation of visual processing reﬂected
in lower RT latencies for the subliminal threat condition in the
SAD group only. These effects would provide further support
for enhanced unconscious threat processing in SAD individuals
and may have important implications for the development of new
treatment strategies.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Social anxiety disorder and control group participants were
recruited via an electronic announcement, addressing all under-
graduate students of the University of Tübingen who either
experience anxiety in social interactions or have no interactional
difﬁculties. Interested individuals were then invited for participa-
tion and completed a self-report battery of social anxiety measures
and were administered a clinical interview in order to conﬁrm
the SAD/healthy control group status. All participants completed
questionnaire diagnostics using German versions of several ques-
tionnaires assessing dimensional severity of social anxiety. Social
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) was used to assess the anxiety
experienced in social interactional situations; Social Phobia Scale
(SPS;Mattick andClarke,1998; Stangier et al., 1999)was employed
to measure levels of anxiety when individuals are scrutinized
by others, and Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz,
1987; Stangier et al., 2003) was used to assess the range of social
interaction and performance situations that social phobics may
fear/avoid. Furthermore, a structured interview [Mini Interna-
tional Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998)]
was administered by trained psychologists in order to validate the
clinical diagnosis of SAD and to ensure the diagnosis-free status of
healthy control participants. Exclusion criteria for the SAD partic-
ipants were: a history of or current disorder of the schizophrenic
or bipolar/manic spectrum, a diagnosis of borderline or antiso-
cial personality disorder as well as awareness of the subliminal
stimulus prime as assessed in the recognition task. In the healthy
control group, exclusion criteria were a current psychopathology
or a history thereof as well as awareness of the subliminal stim-
ulus. Two participants from the SAD group and three controls
were excluded due to their performance on the recognition task,
which indicated that they were aware of the subliminal prime. The
ﬁnal sample of consisted of 23 SAD subjects and 23 healthy con-
trols (see Table 1 for more details). Subjects signed an informed
written consent and received monetary compensation for partici-
pation. All experiments reported here were approved by the local
ethics committee and are in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
MATERIALS
Facial stimuli
Angry and neutral facial expressions of seven male models from
theKarolinskaDirected Emotional Faces database (Goeleven et al.,
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Table 1 | Demographic and control measures.
Controls N = 23 gSAD N = 23 Statistics
Age 23.48 (3.57) 23.96 (3.72) t (44) = 0.445; n.s.
Female 55.5% 65.2% χ2
(1) = 0.365; n.s.
LSAS 14.56 (9.47) 75.30 (21.04) t (44) = 11.17; p < 0.05
SIAS 10.33 (4.31) 43.30 (12.53) t (44) = 18.75; p < 0.001
SPS 5.28 (8.25) 35.78 (12.95) t (44) = 7.92; p < 0.05
d ′ 0.24 (0.64) 0.06 (0.60) t (44) = −1.00; n.s.
CR correct 5.60 (2.16) 5.27 (1.86) t (44) = −0.50; n.s.
CR error 5.47 (2.16) 5.11 (1.89) t (44) = −0.58; n.s.
The data represented in the table refers to means and SDs for each measure (in
parentheses). LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale; SIAS = Social Interaction
Anxiety Scale; SPS = Social Phobia Scale; CR = conﬁdence rating.
2008) were selected for the stimulus material. We only included
models who depict anger without opening the mouth or baring
teeth in order to limit the confounding effects of visual features
in the masking procedure (Calvo and Nummenmaa, 2008). This
resulted in a total of 14 color pictures (7 models × 2 expressions),
whichwere edited in order tomatch the basic visual features (lumi-
nance, color) and size (cropping with an oval mask) using Adobe
Photoshop CS4. This was necessary in order to achieve maximum
masking efﬁciency. The emotional expression was parametri-
cally varied using a morphing procedure (FantaMorph software,
Abrosoft, Beijing, China) in which angry and neutral expres-
sions of the same model were blended together. This resulted
in a set of 11 intensity levels (10% increment steps) of angry
expressions ranging from 0% (neutral) to 100% (angry) for each
model (Figure 1B). One model identity was randomly selected
for the subliminal stimulus set (unambiguous neutral and angry
expressions). The stimulus material for the perceptual judgment
task consisted of graded expressions of the remaining models (6
remaining models × 11 intensity levels), which were used as mask
stimuli and two subliminal stimuli (neutral and angry expression
of a randomly selected model identity). Visual stimuli were deliv-
ered viaPresentation software (Version14.5) throughout all phases
of the experiment. Face stimuli (300 × 375 pixel) were presented
in the center of an 19′′ CRT monitor against a black background.
PROCEDURE
After providing written informed consent, participants completed
the questionnaires and the diagnostic interview. The subsequent
experimental procedure included three consecutive steps: In the
ﬁrst step, the participants were exposed to the subliminal stimulus
set in order to establish a comparability to the original experimen-
tal design from our previous studies (Jusyte and Schönenberg,
2013). Next, the participants performed the perceptual decision
task. In the third step, the participants’ ability to perceive the sub-
liminal stimulus was assessed in order to ensure that all subjects
were unaware of the subliminal stimulus condition.
Step I: exposure
During the exposure phase, neutral (50% of the trials) and angry
expressions of one model identity (which later served as the
subliminal stimulus pair) were presented a total of 20 times in
pseudo-randomized order with no more than three identical tri-
als in a row. The temporal structure for the exposure trials was
as follows: an angry/neutral face was presented for 4 s, followed
by 1 s inter-trial-interval (ISI, blank screen). Participants were
instructed to pay close attention to the visual stimuli in order to
“get acquainted with the stimulus material”1.
Perceptual decision task
The task for the participants was to indicate whether a brieﬂy pre-
sented face stimulus was angry or neutral via a button press. The
participants were not informed about the subliminal stimulus pre-
sentation and were instructed to react as quickly and accurately as
possible. Trials were organized in blocks with either a subliminal
presentation of angry or neutral stimulus on every trial through-
out the whole block. One block consisted of 22 trials in which a
subliminal stimulus was immediately masked by a supraliminal
presentation of a mask stimulus. Per block, 11 intensity levels of
two different models were presented once in random order. A total
of six blocks were necessary in order to present all intensity levels
of each model once with a preceding subliminal neutral as well as
angry prime. Four repetitions or a total of 528 trials (6models× 11
intensities × 2 subliminal stimuli × 4 repetitions) were presented
during the experiment. Block and trial order was randomized for
each repetition and participant. The temporal trial structure was
as follows: The trial began with a ﬁxation cross (500 ms, centered)
followed by a subliminal angry or neutral stimulus (30 ms) and
immediately replaced by a 100 ms presentation of the mask, which
was then followed by a 100 ms checkered stimulus (Figure 1A)
and ﬁnally the perceptual decision task. After the participants’
response, the next trial began after a 1 s ISI.
Recognition task
A major issue in all paradigms investigating subliminal process-
ing is the difﬁculty ensure that these stimuli were not consciously
perceived (Pessoa, 2005). In order to address this issue, several
steps were undertaken (Li et al., 2008). First of all, the partici-
pants had no notion of the subliminal stimulus condition. During
the experimental task, the subliminal stimuli were presented for
merely 30 ms and backwardly masked by a stimulus with very
similar perceptual properties. Furthermore, in a recognition task
following the experiment, we assessed both subjective and objec-
tive awareness of the subliminal prime in a perceptual decision
task and a subsequent conﬁdence rating.
Before the recognition task, participants were debriefed about
the subliminal stimulus presentations and were instructed to indi-
cate whether the ﬁrst, brief stimulus was neutral/angry and to
ignore the mask. Following the perceptual decision, the partici-
pants were asked to indicate how conﬁdent they were that they
1The present study is an extension of our previous experimental work. In that
study, we also included a conditioning procedure and investigated how learning
experiences may inﬂuence preattentive processing using the same paradigm (Jusyte
and Schönenberg, 2013). In this prior investigation, we included a conditioning
procedure during which the subliminal stimuli used in the experiment served as
CS+/−. In order to compare the results to a condition in which no conditioning
was applied, we included an exposure phase prior to the experiment. Hence, the
exposure procedure in this study was included as means of ensuring comparability
to our previous work with healthy participants.
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FIGURE 1 | (A)Temporal trial structure for the perceptual decision task. (B) A stimulus set of one model identity parametrically varied in 10% increments
ranging from neutral to angry.
answered correctly on a scale ranging from 1 (not sure at all) to
10 (completely conﬁdent). The conﬁdence rating was chosen as
a subjective measure of awareness. In a total of 36 randomized
trials (6 models × 2 subliminal stimuli × 3 repetitions), inter-
mediate intensity pictures (50%) of each of the six models from
the experimental task were presented as face masks and preceded
by either a subliminal angry or neutral stimulus. The (temporal)
trial structure was identical to the perceptual decision task with
the exception of the conﬁdence rating. d′ scores were computed
as objective indices of awareness. Both subjective and objective
awareness of the subliminal stimulus condition were taken into
account and only subjects who were considered unaware in both
respects were included in the ﬁnal analysis. Subjects were con-
sidered unaware and included in the analysis if they produced a
d′ score between 1 and −1 (d′ range = +/−3.829; d′ = 0 indi-
cates no discriminatory ability) and did not exhibit signiﬁcantly
higher conﬁdence ratings on correct vs. erroneous responses in
the recognition task.
RESULTS
SAMPLE
Demographic and psychopathological description of the ﬁnal
sample is displayed in Table 1. There were no signiﬁcant
differences with regard to age, gender, educational status,
objective/subjective indices of awareness of the subliminal stimu-
lus between groups. The SAD group scored signiﬁcantly higher on
all three dimensional measures of social anxiety (LSAS, SIAS, SPS)
than the control group. None of the control group participants
was diagnosed in the structured interview. All experimental group
participants fulﬁlled the categorical diagnostic criteria for social
phobia.
RECOGNITION TASK
d′ scores were computed for each participant. Participants who
outperformed the criterion range were excluded from the anal-
ysis (two control group and three SAD group participants). A
one-sample t-test for the ﬁnal sample revealed no signiﬁcant dif-
ference from chance level for neither the control [t(22) = 1.84;
p > 0.05] nor the SAD [t(22) = 0.49; p > 0.1] group; the
analysis over collapsed data across groups also did not reach
signiﬁcance [t(45) = 1.67; p > 0.1]. To investigate the subjec-
tive awareness of subliminal stimulus condition, we computed
paired-sample-t-tests regarding conﬁdence ratings on the correct
vs. incorrect responses in the recognition task for each group [SAD:
t(22) = 1.10; controls: t(22) = 0.53; ps > 0.1], yielding no signiﬁ-
cant differences (see Table 1 for more details). The results showed
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that the subjects had virtually no awareness for the subliminal
stimulus condition.
PERCEPTUAL DECISION TASK
The data analysis for the perceptual decision task was conducted in
several steps: Firstly, we computed an analysis in order to investi-
gate the potential perceptual bias. For this purpose, an analysis
was computed for each group with total values reﬂecting the
mean number of “angry” responses for each subliminal stimu-
lus type and mask stimulus intensity. In a second step, we aimed
to explore potential group differences in the perceptual bias related
to subliminal stimulus type by employing d′ scores. This type of
analysis is a more sophisticated way to examine the relative biases
in perception for angry as opposed to neutral primes and has
the advantage of reﬂecting the perceptual bias in a single value,
thereby reducing the complexity of the model. Lastly, in order to
control for potential speed-accuracy trade-offs that may be asso-
ciated with the observed effects, we conducted an analysis of RT
data.
Perceptual bias
In order to investigate the perceptual bias, an initial repeated-
measures ANOVA with two within-subjects factors (subliminal
stimulus type and intensity) as well as one between-subjects fac-
tor (group) was conducted using mean proportion of “angry”
responses for condition and intensity level. The results indi-
cated a main effect of stimulus intensity [F(10, 440) = 572.32;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.93], which was further qualiﬁed by a signiﬁ-
cant condition × group [F(1, 44) = 572.32; p < 0.05; η2p = 0.10]
and a group × intensity interaction on a statistical trend level
[F(10, 440) = 1.80; p < 0.10; η2p = 0.04]. To further inves-
tigate the interaction effects, separate 2 (subliminal stimulus
type)×11 (intensity levels) repeated-measuresANOVAwere com-
puted (Figure 2) for each group. For the control group, there was
a signiﬁcant effect of stimulus intensity [F(10, 220) = 292.08;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.93], but neither subliminal stimulus type
[F(1, 22) = 0.23; p > 0.1; η2p = 0.01] nor interaction [F(10,
220) = 0.44; p > 0.1; η2p = 0.02] reached signiﬁcance. The SAD
group, however, showed a signiﬁcant effect of both intensity [F(10,
220) = 282.67, p < 0.001,η2p = 0.93] and subliminal stimulus type
[F(1, 22) = 7.05; p < 0.05; η2p = 0.24], as well as an interaction
effect [F(10, 220) = 1.93; p < 0.05; η2p = 0.08]. Paired-sample t-
tests (subliminal angry vs. neutral stimulus) were computed in
order to further qualify the interaction effect, yielding signiﬁ-
cant differences at the ﬁrst ﬁve intensity levels (all ps < 0.05).
Thus, the results indicate that only SAD group subjects tended to
make more “angry” responses when the subliminal stimulus was
angry.
In order to investigate whether the differences in perceptual
biases are evident between groups, an additional joint analysis
was computed. Indices of bias for angry and neutral sublimi-
nal conditions (d′ scores) were computed in the same manner
as for the recognition task. This resulted in 11 scores (intensity
of the mask stimulus) for each experimental condition. Pos-
itive scores represent a bias for angry response rating of the
mask stimulus in the subliminal angry relative to the neutral
condition, and vice versa, while a d′-value around 0 represents
no systematic bias. d′ scores were analyzed using a repeated-
measures ANOVA (Figure 4) with one within-subjects-factor
(Intensity) and one between-subjects-factor (Group). Neither
stimulus intensity [F(10,440) = 0.53; p > 0.1; η2p = 0.01] nor
the intensity × group interaction reached signiﬁcance [F(10,
440) = 1.01, p > 0.1; η2p = 0.02]. However, there was a sig-
niﬁcant group effect [F(1, 44) = 4.34, p < 0.05; η2p = 0.09].
Subsequent one-sample t-tests computed with a total mean d′
score over all 11 intensity levels revealed no signiﬁcant differences
from chance level for the control group [M = −0.03; SD = 0.21;
t(22) = −0.63; p > 0.1], whereas the effect was signiﬁcant for
the SAD participants [M = 0.10; SD = 0.20; t(22) = 2.36;
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results for the perceptual judgment task.The percentage of “angry” responses is plotted against stimulus intensity ranging from
neutral (0) to angry (100). The dark circles and solid lines represent an angry subliminal stimulus, the white circles and dashed lines represent a neutral
subliminal stimulus. gSAD, generalized social anxiety disorder; SEM standard error of mean.
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FIGURE 3 | Reaction time latencies for the perceptual judgment task.
Reaction times are plotted against stimulus intensity ranging from neutral (0)
to angry (100). The dark circles and solid lines represent an angry subliminal
stimulus, the white circles and dashed lines represent a neutral subliminal
stimulus. gSAD, generalized social anxiety disorder. MS, milliseconds; SEM,
standard error of mean
p < 0.05]. These results indicate that a systematic tendency for
angry responses as a function of subliminal stimulus condition
was only evident in SAD participants as opposed to the control
group.
Furthermore, a correlation analysis was conducted to further
investigate the relationship between the extent of perceptual bias
in the perceptual decision task (mean d′ scores reﬂecting the
relative tendency to rate mask stimuli as “angry”when the preced-
ing subliminal stimulus was angry) and the objective awareness
measure (sensitivity d′ scores reﬂecting the ability to discrimi-
nate between the subliminal stimulus conditions) obtained in the
recognition task. There were no signiﬁcant correlations between
these two measures neither on the group level (SAD: r = 0.15;
controls: r = −0.10), nor in the collapsed data (r = −0.03, all
ps > 0.1).
Reaction time (Abrantes-Pais et al., 2007)
Reaction time latencies larger than three seconds were excluded
from the analysis. The percentage of excluded trials was not sig-
niﬁcantly different between the control and SADgroup [M = 6.39;
SD = 10.48 and M = 3.13; SD = 4.24; t(44) = 1.36; p > 0.1]. An
initial repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors
subliminal stimulus type and intensity as well as one between-
subjects factor (group) was conducted. The results yielded a main
effect of stimulus intensity [F(10, 220) = 52.57; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.54] as well as a signiﬁcant effect of subliminal stimu-
lus condition [F(10, 440) = 5.10; p < 0.05; η2p = 0.10]. These
main effects were further qualiﬁed by a condition × intensity
interaction [F(10, 440) = 4.30; p > 0.01; η2p = 0.09] and a condi-
tion × intensity × group interaction [F(10, 440) = 2.10; p > 0.05;
η2p = 0.05]. To further investigate the interaction effects, 2 (sublim-
inal stimulus type) × 11 (stimulus intensity) repeated-measures
ANOVAs were computed with mean RTs (Figure 3) for each
group.
A signiﬁcant effect of stimulus intensity emerged in the con-
trol group [F(10, 220) = 26.46; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.55]; there
FIGURE 4 |The results of the d ′ score analysis over collapsed data.
Average scores are plotted against stimulus intensity ranging from neutral
(1) to angry (11). d ′ scores > 1 indicate a bias for “angry” responses in the
subliminal angry as opposed to neutral stimulus condition. gSAD,
generalized social anxiety disorder; SEM, standard error of mean.
was no signiﬁcant effect of subliminal stimulus condition [F(1,
22) = 2.29; p > 0.1; η2p = 0.09] nor did the interaction [F(10,
220) = 1.67; p > 0.05; η2p = 0.07] reach signiﬁcance. In the SAD
group, there was a signiﬁcant effect of stimulus intensity [F(10,
220) = 27.45; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.55] and a signiﬁcant interaction
[F(10, 220) = 4.05; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.16], but no signiﬁcant effect
of subliminal stimulus type [F(1, 22) = 2.8; p > 0.1; η2p = 0.11].
Paired-sample t-tests (subliminal angry vs. neutral stimulus) were
computed for the post hoc analysis in order to further investigate
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the interaction effect for each intensity level of the mask stimuli.
The results revealed that SAD participants exhibited signiﬁcantly
higher RT latencies when the subliminal stimulus was angry vs.
neutral at the ﬁrst four intensity levels (all ps > 0.05). In both
the SAD and the control group, a signiﬁcant quadratic [F(1,
22) = 39.90; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.64 vs. F(1, 22) = 79.24; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.78) as well as linear trend [F(1, 22) = 47.17; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.68 vs. F(1, 22) = 51.40; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.70) emerged for
the averaged RT data, which indicates an inverted U-shape pattern
as well as lower RT latencies for unambiguous angry vs. neutral
expressions.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated whether SAD patients are more
susceptible to the biasing effects of threatening subliminal cues.
The results of the perceptual judgment task showed that SAD sub-
jects tended to make more “angry” responses regarding graded
mask stimuli in trials with a preceding angry vs. neutral sub-
liminal cue, while the proportion of “angry” responses did not
vary as a function of subliminal stimulus condition in healthy
subjects.
These results may reﬂect alterations in early visual process-
ing, which possibly stem from hypersensitivity to threatening
cues in associated subcortical structures (Straube et al., 2005;
Phan et al., 2006; Stein et al., 2007). Accordingly, subliminal
threat cues have been shown to elicit a robust neural response,
particularly in anxiety-prone individuals (Li et al., 2008; Ball
et al., 2012; Brooks et al., 2012). Several studies have inves-
tigated whether social phobia is associated with an increased
sensitivity to facial expressions of threat by employing morphed
stimuli of varying emotional intensity yielding conﬂicting ﬁnd-
ings (Richards et al., 2002; Mullins and Duke, 2004; Philippot
and Douilliez, 2005; Joormann and Gotlib, 2006; Montagne et al.,
2006; Rossignol et al., 2007; Schoﬁeld et al., 2007; Stevens et al.,
2008; Garner et al., 2009; Heuer et al., 2010). Most of these stud-
ies failed to demonstrate that social anxiety is associated with a
biased interpretation of emotion (Mullins and Duke, 2004; Philip-
pot and Douilliez, 2005; Schoﬁeld et al., 2007) while one study
reported a higher (Montagne et al., 2006) and another a lower
(Joormann and Gotlib, 2006) threshold for the onset of negative
emotion in facial expressions. The results of the present study
are in line with previous literature which failed to ﬁnd evidence
for a biased interpretation of emotion in SAD, as our ﬁndings
do not indicate a dramatically increased general perceptual sensi-
tivity to angry expressions in SAD, but they do provide support
for a vulnerability to the biasing effects of unaware stimuli. The
hypersensitivity and earlier onset of hostile cue perception in facial
expressions, of which the anxious individual may not even be
aware, has the potential to cause anxious rumination and misin-
terpretation of the social partner’s facial expression, resulting in a
cognitive overload and a failure to down-regulate these emerging
misinterpretations by means of a top-down control.
Interestingly, the perceptual bias was observed at relatively low
perceptual intensities of anger in mask stimuli (0–50% anger pro-
portion) in the preceding subliminal angry vs. neutral stimulus
condition. This ﬁnding is intriguing, because one would expect
the biasing effect of subliminal cues to be most prominent at
intermediate stimulus intensity levels of the mask stimulus due to
their ambiguity. Our data shows that the SAD group is particularly
sensitive to the biasing effects of the hostile subliminal stimulus
even when the mask stimulus barely contains anger.
The overall results of RT latency revealed an inverted U-shape
pattern with respect to stimulus intensity in both groups, reﬂect-
ing lower RTs for unambiguous angry and neutral expressions
and an increase at intermediate stimulus intensity levels. Hence,
both groups exhibited peak RT latencies at intermediate intensity
levels. This pattern may reﬂect judgment uncertainty associated
with stimulus complexity, which can be assumed to be higher for
ambiguous vs. prototypical expressions (Lim and Pessoa, 2008).
Moreover, both groups exhibited faster RTs for unambiguous
angry vs. neutral expressions. This pattern indicates a behavioral
speeding effect for angry faces, which may reﬂect a prioritized
processing of angry vs. neutral stimuli (Lim and Pessoa, 2008; Lee
et al., 2009).
Furthermore, we hypothesized that the perceptual bias evident
in the SADgroupwould also be associatedwith a behavioral speed-
ing, i.e., faster RT latencies, in the subliminal angry vs. neutral
condition. Our data did not provide support for this assump-
tion; in fact, a contrary interactional effect emerged: SAD subjects
tended to show higher RT latencies in the subliminal angry cue
condition at low to intermediate intensity levels. Interestingly, the
differential RT slowing corresponded closely with the intensity
levels at which perceptual judgment bias for subliminal angry vs.
neutral condition was most prominent. This may be due to the
incompatibility between the prime and the masking stimuli that
call for different response alternatives and result in a competition,
which is considered to be a major determinant of prolonged RT
and erroneous responses (Klapp andHinkley,2002; Praamstra and
Seiss, 2005). Furthermore, the evidence regarding RT speeding for
threatening faces in SAD patients appears to be rather inconsis-
tent (Staugaard, 2010). While some studies report a behavioral
facilitation for affective material (Becker, 2009; Lee et al., 2009;
Olatunji et al., 2011), there is also a line of evidence demonstrat-
ing a behavioral interference, in particular for negative stimuli
(Buodo et al., 2002; Pereira et al., 2006; Sommer et al., 2008; Pereira
et al., 2010). Recent evidence has also uncovered the neural mech-
anisms underlying the interference effects of negative emotional
stimuli on behavior (RT slowing), whichmay represent the basis of
defensive behavioral responses such as freezing (Pereira et al., 2010;
Pichon et al., 2012).
The present study extends our previous experimental work,
which has some implications for the understanding of general
mechanisms of affective stimulus processing as well as for the
etiologicalmodels of anxious psychopathology. The affective judg-
ment pattern observed in the SAD group strongly resembles the
results obtained in Experiment 1 of our previous experimental
series (Jusyte and Schönenberg, 2013). The behavioral data of
healthy participants who performed the same judgment task after
undergoing an aversive learning procedure, where the angry face
(which later served as the subliminal stimulus in the affective
judgment task) was paired with an aversive outcome, bears sub-
stantial similarity to the performance of SAD participants, who
did not receive aversive conditioning. Therefore, the paradigm
employed in our previous investigation with healthy participants
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may be an analog of the naturalistic process by which atten-
tional vigilance in social anxiety develops, where an inherently
negative stimulus is repeatedly paired with aversive experiences.
To some extent, this may also reﬂect a natural and adaptive
process by means of which individuals become more sensitive
to facial displays of threat/dissaproval in those individuals with
whom they associate unpleasant experiences. In future stud-
ies, it would be interesting to investigate whether other forms
of experiential learning based on interactional outcomes, such
paradigms involving social exclusion or inclusion experiences,
would result in a similar sensitization toward subliminal threat
stimuli.
These results of the present study also have some important
implications regarding the development and maintenance of SAD.
The data indicate that SAD patients exhibit an inherent anxious
response pattern and appear to be sensitive to even very subtle signs
of threat,whichhave thepotential to guide volitional behavior. The
fact that SAD participants do not require conditioning in order to
unfold this sensitivity may be due to previous learning experiences
in real life, in which facial expressions of anger or disapproval have
acquired a potent signaling function. An angry face may represent
such a highly potent signal of threat for social phobics that even a
subtle “hint” of a hostile percept could sufﬁce to bias early visual
processing, resulting in a perceptual bias for “angry” responses
even without prior conditioning, possibly due to prior aversive
conditioning in real-world contexts.
Interestingly, both in this as well as our previous investiga-
tion using the same paradigmatic approach, we did not ﬁnd
evidence for a biased performance as a function of subliminal
prime in healthy individuals, which contradicts a large number
of studies from the priming literature (Murphy and Zajonc, 1993;
Rotteveel et al., 2001; Winkielman et al., 2005; Dannlowski and
Suslow, 2006; Almeida et al., 2013). On the other hand, not all
studies have been able to replicate the threat processing advantage
and conﬂicting evidence is reported over a variety of paradigms
stemming from the attentional as well as perceptual unaware-
ness literature (Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa et al., 2005, 2006; Bar-Haim
et al., 2007; Purcell and Stewart, 2010; Lee et al., 2011). This
may for one be due to the stimulus material employed in these
studies. For instance, in an experimental series conducted by
Calvo and Nummenmaa (2008), the authors concluded that not
the emotional valence but certain salient physical features may
underlie the processing advantage of emotional expressions in the
face in the crowd paradigm. These salient features refer to the
distribution of luminance in an emotional face caused by nar-
rowing or widening the eyes, visibility of the teeth or opening
the mouth. Paradigms for the investigation of subliminal threat
processing may be even more vulnerable to these confounding
effects. Considering the fact that many of the studies from the
priming literature used characters rather than faces as masks, and
the primes themselves were not cropped to remove areas such as
hair in order to reduce contrast and target visibility, the reported
priming effects may in part be due to a greater prime visibility.
In addition, it is very hard to rule out this possibility due to the
fact that most studies did not employ a valid awareness manip-
ulation check to rule out this possibility. Some authors go so
far as to say that priming effects may actually just reﬂect visual
confounds caused by insufﬁcient masking ability (Pessoa, 2005;
Pessoa et al., 2005, 2006). However, a number of recent ﬁndings
call these conclusions into question. For instance, studies that
had employed extremely brief presentation times (17–20 ms) still
found a reliable amygdalar signal to brieﬂy presented threatening
stimuli (Pegna et al., 2004; Whalen et al., 2004; Liddell et al., 2005;
Williams et al., 2005; Ohrmann et al., 2007; Pegna et al., 2008).
Hence, the presence or absence of behavioral priming effects
may critically depend on the extent of such activation, which is
likely why this study did ﬁnd priming effects in individuals who
have been shown to be particularly sensitive to displays of threat,
namely SAD.
The present study has several strengths and limitations worth
mentioning. Among the strengths are the homogenous SAD and
the well-matched control group as well as the within-subjects
repeated-measures design, which provides for a high statistical
power of the obtained results. Furthermore, we employed highly
homogenous stimulus material regarding color, luminance and
the distribution of light and dark areas in the emotional faces,
which allowed for a very efﬁcient masking procedure. The assess-
ment of subjective as well as objective awareness of the subliminal
stimulus is recommended for investigationswhich employ sublim-
inal primes (Pessoa, 2005) and has been followed in the present
study. One limitation concerns our stimulus material, which
included only one emotional expression, namely varying inten-
sities of anger. Several studies have shown that socially anxious
individuals exhibit alterations in the processing of facial expres-
sions exhibiting not only overt aggression (anger) but also milder
forms of hostile expression that signal disapproval, such as dis-
gust and contempt (Stein et al., 2002; Amir et al., 2005; Phan
et al., 2006). Hence, future studies should attempt to investigate
how the present ﬁndings extend to other forms of hostile facial
expression. Furthermore, although we made attempts to match
the priming and masking stimuli on low-level visual features by
excluding models with visible displays of teeth, the inﬂuence of
such features cannot be entirely ruled out. For instance, two recent
studies that used subliminal presentation using continuous ﬂash
suppression indicated that low-level features, such as spatial fre-
quencies, may underlie emotion processing advantages observed
in similar paradigms (Stein and Sterzer, 2012; Stein et al., 2014).
Perhaps the strongest argument against this is that we found group
differences between SAD and healthy controls; thus, the percep-
tual sensitivity to subliminal displays of anger was associated with
a factor related to an inherently individual characteristic of one
group. Although the role of low-level features cannot be entirely
ruled out, we believe that it does not sufﬁciently explain all of
the results obtained in this study. For future research working
with backward-masking paradigms, we recommend to include a
more rigorous and sophisticated control of low-level visual fea-
tures such as adjustments and matching of root mean square
contrast.
In addition, while enhanced visual processing due to direct
projections from hyperactive subcortical structures is a likely
mechanism that accounts for the present results, we did not
test these assumptions using brain imaging techniques. More-
over, we cannot rule out that the observed effects are related to
differences in response priming rather than shifts in perceptual
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sensitivity, that is, the prime could simply affect response crite-
ria, rather than actual expression perception. Future studies that
employ both imaging techniques and sophisticated experimental
designs which allow to distinguish between response and percep-
tual biases are needed to understand the underlying mechanism.
Finally, this study did not elucidate whether the enhanced per-
ceptual sensitivity is part of a SAD symptom correlate or rather a
marker for vulnerability. This issue should be elucidated in future
research.
In summary, the present work provides further evidence for
enhanced perceptual processing of threatening facial expressions
in SAD individuals. These ﬁndings beg the question whether the
bias observed in our study is stable and whether it can be modiﬁed
by means of classical cognitive–behavioral intervention methods
or new computer-based training approaches that target attentional
processes (Bar-Haim,2010). It is possible thatmodiﬁcation of later
processing stages, may have a synergic effect on the automatic
processing stages, but the anxious perceptual processing style may
also be stable, which would mean that anxious individuals would
always remain prone to relapse into an anxious psychopathology.
Incorporation of these aspects in psychoeducation and strength-
ening the patient’s ability to employ top-down strategies in order
to counter the hyperactive threat detection system may be a use-
ful strategy to down-regulate the hypersensitive perceptual threat
processing. The present paradigmatic approach may be useful in
future studies inorder to elucidate these issues and could alsoprove
to be a suitable outcome measure that reﬂects early information
processing.
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